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This study explores investment dynamics based on interlocking directorates and performance 
differentials of two kinds of publically traded firms operating in the Indian market: Non-affiliated, 
small firms and family-controlled, large firms. Considering four important sectors (fashion; 
manufacturing; transport; food) of the Indian market, this study finds that a significant fraction of 
the small firms are able to maintain stable performance over time by forging strategic ties with 
similar other firms in transactional supply-chain modes, although many large, family-controlled firms 
dominate sections of the market. Firm board interlocks play a crucial role in strategizing investment 
decisions and tie-forging processes for the small firms. This study contributes to a deeper 
understanding of the question concerning how investments of small firms might be governed 
through interfirm ties of coordinated and cooperative activities. The results have important 
implications for small firms operating in the markets of a number of emerging economies of the 
world. 
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1. Introduction  
 
A question of major theoretical and empirical interest concerns how capital investment structures of 
small-sized1, non-affiliated2 (SNA) firms enable them to compete in a market, significant sections of 
which are dominated by large, family-controlled (LFC) firms 3. Earlier scholars have investigated 
various aspects of this question (Carney, 2005; Claessens & Fan, 2002; Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Klapper 
& Love, 2004; La Porta et al., 1999; Miller et al., 2008; Randolph et al., 2021), which have important 
implications for many emerging economies. In this paper, we examine this question by closely looking 
at the dynamics of investments and performances of these firms over time. We test our model using 




1 We only investigate stock-listed companies. Firms are considered “small” if they are much smaller than “large” firms in terms 
of their total asset holdings, total sales, market values of equity, and the number of employees.  
 
2 In this paper, “non-affiliated” refers to firms that are not controlled by any business families. 
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With large concentrations of a family’s wealth in a group of LFCs, the family promoters, by dint of 
their substantial ownership stakes and influential positions on the firm boards, dictate major 
governance policies for the firms under their direct leadership, which are motivated primarily by their 
personal attitudes, ideas, objectives, policies, and politics. Over the years, this phenomenon has 
come to govern the dynamics of the Indian market in multiple sectors of the industry (Chakrabarti et 
al., 2008; Gollakota & Gupta, 2006; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Ray et al., 2018; Selarka, 2005). Importantly, 
LFCs are not always single-family concerns where ownership and control are limited to single-family 
units (Litz, 1995). These Goliaths of the industry could even be controlled by the immediate and 
extended members of influential business families, with first cousins, second cousins, in-laws, parents, 
grandparents, uncles, aunts, and possibly many other relations of blood or marriage serving as 
promoters or outside directors on the firm boards (Jackling & Johl, 2009; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; 
Westhead et al., 2001). 
 
Since colonial times and even after India’s independence in 1947, these LFCs, with their select and 
influential (and sometimes politically powerful!) coterie of family members, community stalwarts, and 
political advisors have controlled large sections of the Indian market (Bajpai, 2016; Gollakota & 
Gupta, 2006; Kumar & Singh, 2013). These firms – the Goliaths of the industry – vary in size and age, as 
well as in their degree of diversification, but in time, their influence spreads across sectors to dominate 
the market that includes other players, such as the Davids of the industry – the SNAs (Manos et al., 
2007; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
 
Some recent work notwithstanding, this critical issue has remained somewhat underrepresented in 
the extant literature on many emerging economies. The present study does not claim to present a 
theoretical model to explain the issue in all facets of it. Rather, the study is exploratory in nature. In 
particular, it makes evaluative analyses of the investment and performance differentials of SNAs in 
comparison with those of LFCs operating in the Indian market. Specifically, it contributes to this 
literature in two ways. First, it finds that, although SNAs continuously contend with the powerful 
spatiotemporal advantage enjoyed by influential LFCs, many SNAs do perform consistently well. 
These firms are empowered by large-scale, open-market conditions in the Indian market today, 
along with opportunities for global business transactions, internationalization, and improved 
corporate governance policies instituted by market regulators in recent years. Second, the study 
explores conditions under which SNAs are able to withstand the dominant competitive pressure of 
LFCs by strategically leveraging board-interlocked resources in proliferating transactional 
relationships with allied firms not only in the same industry sector but also across different ones. To be 
effective, the firms make carefully chosen, judiciously planned, and purposeful investments in capital 
expenditures to enhance their internal efficiency as well as to make their interfirm business operations 
more productive, smooth, and profitable. They develop, in this way, a select coterie of firms in order 
to be able to compete in the market, which critically determines their future survival and growth4. 





4 Indian LFCs also participate in supply-chain networks (Bajpai, 2016). However, because they are strongly family-controlled, a 
large number of family members or extended relations of promoters sit on their boards as outside directors, simply supporting 
all decisions taken by the promoters. The non-functional, decorative role of these directors does not help in making networking 
connections for strategic investments for the company (Gollakota & Gupta, 2006). Therefore, although LFCs engage in 
interlocking directorates and collaborative activities, the large family dominance of their boards makes them much less 
efficient than SNAs in terms of reducing risks and increasing chances of success by making strategic decisions for networked 
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2. Capital Investments 
 
2.1 Theoretical considerations  
Primarily, firms engage in two modes of investments. First, for running core operations utilizing labor, 
infrastructure, technology, plants, machinery, other equipment, and so on, essential investments vary 
from one firm to another and depend on the internal requirements of a firm in diverse channels of its 
business operations (Almeida & Campello, 2007; Booth et al., 2001; Short, 1994). Second, the 
investment structures for interfirm supply-chain networked transactions transcend the specifics of any 
particular firm (Baiman & Rajan, 2002; Paulraj et al., 2008; Rungtusanatham et al., 2003). These latter 
types of investments are coordinated with allied investments of firms’ supply-chain partners and are 
needed to reduce interfirm transactional non-uniformities. The capital investment objective is to not 
only enhance the firm’s internal performance but also to ensure transactional smoothness across the 
chain of firms brought together through their focused, interlinked operations (Bidault & Salgado, 2001; 
Huggins, 2010; Kapoor, 2014; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). A principal mechanism by which the 
supply-chain partnering process is facilitated lies in board interlocks of firms, in which independent 
directors are selected on the firm board from its partner firms and in the degree to which resources 
brought into the firm by these directors can be effectively leveraged (Ingley et al., 2017). 
 
For firms to effectively perform their business operations in supply-chain modes, investments in asset 
procurement and utilization are necessary to meet the demands of their supported operations 
(Cousins & Menguc, 2006; Thomas & Griffin, 1996). Enhanced investment coordination with partners 
serves to maximize future cash flows as well as to reduce short-term oscillations and volatilities in 
production and support functions (Baiman & Rajan, 2002; Craighead et al., 2007). In a growth-driven 
mode, a firm’s supplier-base expands over time, in response to which well-directed investments are 
made by firms to cope with rising demands for increasing inventory turnover, stocking facilities, trade 
receivables, and other asset forms (Bidault & Salgado, 2001; Lee et al., 1997). Further investments 
must also be made to enlarge relevant distribution channels of the consumer-base to meet specific 
requirements for cash flows and material resources. These investments must be directed to ensure 
that transactions down the supply chain are largely free from undesirable oscillations (Thomas & 
Griffin, 1996). 
 
In order to establish a balance, interfirm operations must be reconciled with those that are needed 
for internal production effectiveness and efficiency. The investments depend on a number of factors, 
including, for instance, firm age, size, and industry; equity and debt positions; number and skill-levels 
of employees; current capacity utilization; and so on (Almeida & Campello, 2007). Whereas 
interlinked investments benefit from interfirm knowledge and resources, firm-specific investments 
depend on a firm’s internal capacities and requirements for knowledge and resources and do not 
require external input in order to be functional (Nise, 2015). However, in making strategic investment 
decisions, there frequently arises a tension between these investment modes. Nevertheless, a 
balance may eventually emerge. If it does, then levels of internal investments can be reconciled with 
degrees of interfirm investments under prevailing market conditions. The balance ensures a uniformity 
between the investment modes and enhance financial performance over time. 
 
2.2 Firm Connectivity Structure 
A large fraction of SNAs in India capitalizes on strategic investments by means of transaction-linked 
relationships with similar other firms in order to find expanding opportunities (Gollakota & Gupta, 2006; 
Goswami, 2002; Sankar et al., 2015). Prior research has also shown that small firms benefit from 
strategic investments in order contend with market dominance exercised by large firms by virtue of 
their size, financial strength, and marketing power (Young et al., 2014). In this regard, resource 
dependence theory underscores the critical resource provision role played by the firm board (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). Board directors facilitate the creation of relationships with an organization’s external 
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(McDonald et al., 2008), and help company executives identify potential growth linkages through 
financial ties that include infrastructure setup, internal loans, and debt opportunities 
(Bandyopadhyay & Das, 2005; Manos et al., 2007). The diversity in the board provides the necessary 
conduit for expanding firm operations in multiple directions (Ingley et al., 2017)5. 
Specifically, when SNAs operate in an industry that is vastly dominated by a number of influential 
LFCs, it is strategically advantageous for them to maintain a partnering network with similar firms on 
its supply-chains in different sectors. Most frequently, these connections materialize through the 
sharing of common board directors (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999; Elango & Pattnaik, 2007). Over time, a 
mature relationship governs the current and future capital structures of firms, influencing the existing 
patterns of firm-interlinked investments. Afterwards, as connections consolidate and become 
sufficiently stable, they constitute a support system for capital structures (Booth et al., 2001; Simpson 
& Gleason, 1999). 
Although a number of influential LFCs6 in India also tap opportunities for similar investments through 
their interlocking directorates, these are frequently limited to the firms that they currently control or 
those that they are in the process of acquiring in course of their business expansions. The strategic 
decisions are governed primarily by the influence of the family-related promoters sitting on firm 
boards (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Randolph et al., 2021; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Oftentimes, a one-
sided family diktat dominating such critical investment decisions causes a failure for the vast majority 
of LFC firms to attain the desired investment balance. By contrast, the balance emerges for SNAs 
through the strategic deployment of their interlocking ties, even when influential family connections 
or strong community relationships do not exist. 
 
3. Framework for Exploratory Analysis 
 
3.1 Firm Interlock Network 
Our model is conceptualized with capital investments of firms unfolding on a network comprising 𝑛𝑛 
firms that are connected by ties of interlocking directorate through the sharing of one or more 
directors on the boards7. A tie carries a weight proportional to the total number of shared directors 
on the boards. Such a network of size 𝑛𝑛  with 𝑚𝑚  ties can be characterized by an 𝑛𝑛-dimensional, 
square, symmetric weight matrix 𝑾𝑾: 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, 2, …, if firms 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 are associated by sharing a 
number 1, 2, … of directors; 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 otherwise. Conceptually, when two firms share many directors on 
their boards, their coupling strength is large compared with when they shared only a few directors. 
A strong sharing offers a greater opportunity for coordinated and strategic decision-making. 
However, a tie’s directionality is irrelevant. 
3.2 Conditions for Firm Investment Behavior 
Three conditions govern firm investment behavior: 
 
5 Interlocking directorates are well-known for the management of cooperation. However, it is by no means the only possible 
instrument to manage cooperation and network ties for investment purposes. Nevertheless, for most firms in India, board 
interlocks play the most significant role in networking activities and decision-making (Bajpai, 2016). 
6  Some of these firms are even members of major business groups controlled by families of industrialists or mercantile 
communities in the country. 
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1. Each firm exhibits a characteristic form for the firm-specific investment. 
2. Firm-specific investments are distinct from firm-interlinked investments. 
3. Investment balance attains over a period when transients are smoothed out or eliminated. 
Condition 1 approximates the effect that financial decisions affect each firm in a similar way in the 
absence of rare events, market instabilities, or turbulences. This signifies that the firm-specific 
investment function exhibits behavioral isomorphism. Condition 2 prohibits interactive effects to 
operate between the two forms of investments over the period of interest. Condition 3, which is 
common in most financial and macroeconomic studies, implies that the transaction-linked ties 
between firms take some appropriate time to consolidate, whenever they do. 
 
3.3 Investment Dynamics on Board Interlock Network 
The investment variable 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡)  represents the amount of capital expenditures made by firm 𝑖𝑖 . A 
knowledge of this variable for all the firms in the network characterizes an investment state for the 
entire system. This quantity is shaped board interlock networks of firms, because, as already explained 
before, firm investment dynamics is largely dependent on-board structures. It is therefore possible to 
represent a specific investment configuration at time 𝑡𝑡  by the 𝑛𝑛 -dimensional vector 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) =
{𝐼𝐼1(𝑡𝑡), 𝐼𝐼2(𝑡𝑡), … , 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡)}, where the index 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑛𝑛 runs over all firms in the network (Barrat et al., 2008; 
Newman, 2010). 
The rate of change of 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) for firm 𝑖𝑖 is envisaged as a superposition of two independent investment 
modes: (1) firm-specific, characterized by the function 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) pertaining to firm 𝑖𝑖’s unique, internal 
investment; (2) firm-interlinked, characterized by the function 𝜒𝜒(𝑾𝑾, 𝐼𝐼) pertaining to firm 𝑖𝑖’s investment 
in coordination with its supply-chain partners. The complete dynamics, then, assumes the form: 𝐼𝐼?̇?𝑖 =
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + 𝜒𝜒(𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖), where the overdot represents time derivative. The 𝜒𝜒(𝑊𝑊, 𝐼𝐼) term embodies linearly 
additive terms in the investment: 𝜒𝜒�𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖� = ∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖 , where 𝜑𝜑(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) is a 2-firm, dyadic function 
coupling the investments of firms 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. To make the framework general, we take 𝜑𝜑(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) to be non-
symmetric: 𝜑𝜑(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) ≠ 𝜑𝜑(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) . Additionally, by the assumption of behavioral isomorphism, we set 
𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) = 𝜓𝜓(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖),∀ 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛. The complete investment dynamics now takes on a simpler appearance: 
𝐼𝐼?̇?𝑖 = 𝜓𝜓(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) + ∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖 . 
3.4 Investment Balance 
In the interfirm mode, a deficit investment amount between firms 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 is characterized by the 2-
firm function taking the form 𝜑𝜑�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖� = 𝜔𝜔(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) − 𝜔𝜔�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�, where 𝜔𝜔(𝐼𝐼) is a 1-firm function (Barrat et al., 2008; 
Newman, 2010). Fundamentally, it is the effect of how firm 𝑖𝑖 makes its investments in coordination 
with firm 𝑗𝑗. Thus, for example, as firm 𝑗𝑗 invests more in doing business with firm 𝑖𝑖, the latter, in turn, will 
also make proportionately large amounts of investments8. 
Investment balance is characterized by a vector Ɵ�⃗ = {𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗}  for which 𝐼𝐼?̇?𝑖 = 0,∀ 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛 . With 
differentially coupled investments, the condition 𝜓𝜓(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗) + ∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗� = 0𝑖𝑖  reads: 𝜓𝜓(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗) + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝜔𝜔(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗) −
∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜔𝜔�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗� = 0𝑖𝑖 , where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖≠𝑖𝑖  is the strength of firm 𝑖𝑖 in the interlock (Barthélemy et al., 2005), 
and 𝜍𝜍 = 1
𝑛𝑛
∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  is the average strength of the complete network. Introducing a small perturbation 𝜂𝜂 
around Ɵ�⃗ and ignoring terms in 2nd-order of smallness, the following investment pattern results: ?̇?𝜂𝑖𝑖 =




′(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗) ; 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are derivatives of the 2-firm 
function with respect to its first and second arguments respectively, given by  𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑𝑎𝑎�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗� = 𝜔𝜔′(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗) =
 
8 Firms do not make investments in this way unless they are interlocked in a governance structure in which they perform 
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𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖, and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑𝑏𝑏�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗� = − 𝜔𝜔′�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗� = −𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖. These quantities are the model parameters, in terms of which 
the final equation can be expressed as ?̇?𝜂𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝔾𝔾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , where 𝔾𝔾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . In matrix 
notation, the form looks quite simple:  ?̇?𝜂 = ℕ𝜂𝜂, where ℕ stands for the matrix 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 + 𝔾𝔾. 
The eigenvalues of ℕ are of the form 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞 (𝑞𝑞 = 1, … , 𝑟𝑟), where 𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞 is an eigenvalue of 𝔾𝔾. In order 
for the balance to be stable, it is necessary that 𝜔𝜔𝑞𝑞 = 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞 < 0. Besides, 𝜆𝜆𝑞𝑞’s are known to be positive 
semi-definite (Olfati-Saber, 2006). This results in the condition 𝜌𝜌 = 𝜓𝜓′(𝐼𝐼∗) < 0. Importantly, the stable 
balance condition can be expressed fully in terms of 𝜆𝜆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 , the leading eigenvalue of 𝔾𝔾. Thus, the 
network’s macrostructure is encoded in 𝔾𝔾  through its weight matrix 𝑾𝑾 , which is reflected in the 
quantity 𝜆𝜆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙. By contrast, the network dynamics of firm-specific and the firm-interlinked investments 
is embedded in the two functions 𝜔𝜔 and 𝜓𝜓. Through these functions, the dynamics of the underlying 
network can be maintained9. Table 1 summarizes the variables and parameters used in the study. 
Table 1: Summary of Variables and Parameters of Firm Investments 
Symbol Explanation 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 Investment of firm 𝑖𝑖 
𝑛𝑛 Total number of firms in interlocking directorate 
𝑚𝑚 Total number of ties between pairs of firms in network 
𝑾𝑾 = {𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} Weight matrix of tie strengths between connected firms in network 
𝜓𝜓(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) Firm-specific investment of firm 𝑖𝑖 
𝜑𝜑(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) Non-symmetric 2-firm function coupling investments of firms 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 
𝜔𝜔(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) 1-firm function for firm 𝑖𝑖’s investment to coupled investments 
Ɵ�⃗ Investment balance vector 
𝜌𝜌 Self-induced investment pertaining to firm’s investment differential 
𝜎𝜎, 𝜏𝜏 Firm-interlinked investment pertaining to firm’s investment differential 
𝜆𝜆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 Leading eigenvalue of the graph Laplacian 
 
 
4. Research Setting and Data 
 
For this study, we used board data of publicly listed non-banking, non-finance-sector firms for the 
year 2014-2017 to construct the sector-specific interlock networks. This period was chosen, because 
it was relatively stable for the Indian economy, with practically little or no extraordinary events. 
Moreover, the board interlock structures of our sample of firms did not change significantly over this 
horizon. Board data included information about company board characteristics, the directors as well 
as a number of other company attributes for each company in the sample. Specific information 
about directors on the boards was obtained from data purchased from the Prime Database Group 
(http://www.primedatabase.com). For companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE – 
http://www.bseindia.com) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE – http://www.nseindia.com), firm-
level data pertaining to capital investment, operational accounting, and performance were 
obtained from the Prowess database, which is owned, designed, and maintained by the Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy Pvt. Ltd. – (www.cmie.com). The data were subsequently cross validated 
against published annual financial reports of all companies included in the sample. The processed 
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data for the window 2007–2015 (inclusive) were then stored in databases constructed and designed 
for optimized search and retrieval. 
There is sufficient early evidence that firms operating within the same industry sector exhibit similar 
patterns of capital structures (Bradley et al., 1984; Titman & Wessels, 1988). For this study, we grouped 
our firms by major industry sectors10. For inclusive illustration and analysis in this paper, we selected 
the top four sectors by interlock size. These sectors are fashion (LFC = 101; SNA = 151); manufacturing 
(LFC = 117; SNA = 140); transport (LFC = 99; SNA = 128); and food (LFC = 93; SNA = 122), where the 
figures in parentheses indicate the sizes of the LFC and SNA interlock networks in the corresponding 
sectors (see Table 2 for details). 
Historically, LFCs have played a critically important role in India’s economy. Because of the country’s 
long tradition of family- and community-controlled firms (Kumar & Singh, 2013; Ray et al., 2018; 
Selarka, 2005), there is a strong connection linking these families, communities, and businesses in India 
(Bajpai, 2016). Nevertheless, it has sometimes been criticized that an excessive dominance exercised 
by these firms over the market reduces overall market efficiency and performance (Gollakota & 
Gupta, 2006). On the other hand, market liberalization and constructive steps taken subsequently by 
market regulators such as, the Securities and Exchange Board of India or SEBI, have ameliorated the 
governance situation in the corporate sector. This has given rise to a significant flow of capital 
investments from SNAs to grow and expand in order to compete with market controlling LFCs through 
their board influence, range, and subsidiary deployments in the market (Bajpai, 2016). 
To collect data for the sample of firms for SNA and LFC interlocks, we excluded all Indian subsidiaries 
of foreign multinationals as well as financial services and banking firms that adhere to different 
accounting standards. In conformity with the practice followed by prior researchers (Claessens & 
Fan, 2002; Singla et al., 2014; Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Ray et al., 2018), we identified a firm as LFC if 
the primary family has a vested stake amounting to 20% or higher in the firm, in which a member of 
this family sits on the firm board and/or functions as the board chair. 
Our primary study variable is capital investment of firms. Following earlier convention (Ascioglu et al., 
2008; Coles et al., 2006; Martin et al., 2013), we computed it as the total amount of spending on all 
of the following items: Land and building; plant and machinery; computers and electrical assets; 
transport, communication equipment, and infrastructure; furniture, social amenities, and other fixed 
assets11. Finally, groups of firms were compared based on the four standard performance indicators: 
Return of equity (ROE); Return on assets (ROA); Tobin’s Q (TQ); Price-earnings multiples (PE). 
 
5. Computations 
In keeping with behavioral isomorphism, we employed two separate models for the 2-firm function 
but keep the firm-specific investment function the same in both cases12. 
5.1. Firm-specific investments 
To find the form of the firm-specific function, we examined an empirical time series of the capital 
expenditures of all non-interlocked isolates in every industry sector included in the sample. In Figure 
 
10 The sectors are listed on the National Portal of India (https://www.india.gov.in). 
11 Of course, several other components may be aggregated into the total realizable capital expenditures of firms. However, 
for the present study, the items listed above provide an adequate approximation. 
12 The bulk of the numerical work in this study was performed using routines written in the C++ programming language and in 
Matlab R2013a (8.1.0.604). A few computations for the large-scale network metrics were carried out with the Pajek 4.04 





THE DAVIDS AND THE GOLIATHS 
1, these plots are illustrated for two sectors: Fashion (𝐴𝐴2𝐵𝐵2) and manufacturing (𝐴𝐴1𝐵𝐵1). The phase-
plane dynamics, exhibited in Figure 2, is identical for both. The regions 𝐵𝐵1  and 𝐵𝐵2  correspond to 
actual time series data obtained from the manufacturing and fashion sectors respectively. The 
regions 𝐴𝐴1 and 𝐴𝐴2 correspond to unspecified initial-period investments13. For the selected firm groups 
in the samples, such early data were unavailable. Nevertheless, the typical early-time behavior 
exhibits either growth or decline in a nearly linear fashion before a saturation region is reached 
(Almeida & Campello, M. 2007; Hillier & McColgan, 2006). In time, the growth phase corresponds to 
incrementally rising investment amounts, and the decline phase corresponds to incrementally falling 
ones, assuming that investments started at some initial time 𝑡𝑡 = 0. The reason is that, the near-linear 
investment growth or decline persists only over a fairly short initial window, after which it begins to 
saturate. Following on this clue to firm’s investment trends, the firm-specific function is modeled as 
𝜓𝜓(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖), where 𝛼𝛼 is a positive constant. In this case, the network reaches balance at 𝐼𝐼∗ = 114. 
On the interval (0,1), 𝜓𝜓(𝐼𝐼) > 0: the flow carries the phase point to the right toward 𝐼𝐼∗ = 1. On (1,∞), 
𝜓𝜓(𝐼𝐼) < 0: the flow carries it to the left toward 𝐼𝐼∗ = 1. In either case, the phase point drifts toward 𝐼𝐼∗ = 1 
and settles right there. The characteristic time scale of convergence is given by the quantity 𝛼𝛼−1, 
which characterizes the time for 𝐼𝐼(𝑡𝑡) to vary significantly around 𝐼𝐼∗ = 1. 
 
Figure 1. Time-series of firm-specific 
investments (unscaled) of non-interlocked 
isolates in fashion (lower curve) and 
manufacturing (upper curve) 
Figure 2. Phase plane diagram 
corresponding to Figure 1 
  
  
5.2. Firm-interlinked investments 
Early firm-interlinked investment dynamics is marked by sporadic capital expenditures during by a 
firm’s initial negotiations and adjustments with its supply-chain partners. Since this behavior does not 
show isomorphism, it is not included in the study. Interest, however, focuses on the long-run balance, 
for which two separate models for the 2-firm function are employed. 
Model 1. By its very construction, the 2-firm function embodies a deficit: 𝜑𝜑�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖� = 𝜔𝜔(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) − 𝜔𝜔�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�. When 
the interlocked firms operate in supply-chain-linked modes, a practically reasonable 1-firm function 
can be represented as 𝜔𝜔(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)−1, where 𝛽𝛽 is a positive constant. As 𝐼𝐼 → 0, one has 𝜔𝜔 ~ 𝐼𝐼, 
and as 𝐼𝐼 → ∞, it is seen that 𝜔𝜔 approaches 𝛽𝛽 asymptotically. Since 𝜔𝜔′(𝐼𝐼∗) = 𝛽𝛽 > 0, the trivial fixed point 
 
13 The initial periods are characteristic of the investment behavior of a firm immediately after the inception of specific projects 
or just after it has been listed on a stock exchange. 
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𝐼𝐼∗ = 0 is inherently unstable. Henceforth, this impractical condition will not be of any concern to this 
study. The actual form of the 2-firm function is 𝜑𝜑�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖� = 𝛽𝛽
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖−𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
(1+𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)(1+𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)
. In this model, the balance 




Model 2. In this model, the 1-firm function is taken to be 𝜔𝜔(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖) = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝛾𝛾 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖), where 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 0 are the 
investment levels of firms 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 respectively, and 𝛾𝛾 is a positive constant. Physically, this form embodies 
a synergistic investment relationship between firms 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. This signifies, for a definite level of 𝑗𝑗’s 
investments, the corresponding investment amount of 𝑖𝑖 rises initially but declines subsequently. More 
specifically, for a given value of 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖’s amount varies quadratically in 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 that is zero when 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = {0, 𝛾𝛾 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖} 
and reaches a maximum of 1
4
(𝛾𝛾 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)2  at 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 =
1
2
(𝛾𝛾 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖). This yields the 2-firm function 𝜑𝜑�𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖� = (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 −
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)(𝛾𝛾 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖). The fixed point for the firm-specific component (𝐼𝐼∗ = 1�⃗ ) is a large-scale solution in this 




where 𝛼𝛼, 𝛾𝛾 > 0 . Additionally, the symmetric graph Laplacian has real, non-negative eigenvalues 
(Anderson & Morley, 1985; Li & Zhang, 1998), imposing the further restriction that 𝛾𝛾 > 1 , so that, 
ultimately, 0 < 𝛾𝛾 < � 1
𝜆𝜆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
� 𝛼𝛼. Assuming that 𝜓𝜓(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗) = 0 has a solution 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑠𝑠, one has 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛾𝛾 − 𝑠𝑠. Since 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ ≠
𝑠𝑠, there is a further restriction on 𝛾𝛾: 𝛾𝛾 ≠ 2𝑠𝑠. 
 
5.3. Numerics 
The network’s structural computation rests on the graph Laplacian matrix 𝔾𝔾. Denote the leading 
eigenvalue of 𝔾𝔾 by 𝜆𝜆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎. The stationarity condition in model 1 is then given by 𝜆𝜆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 <
4𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽
, and the basin 
boundary is given parametrically by the equation 𝛽𝛽 = ( 4
𝜆𝜆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝛼𝛼 . In model 2, the corresponding 
condition is 𝜆𝜆𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 <
𝛼𝛼
𝛾𝛾−1
, and the basin boundary is given by 𝛾𝛾 = � 1
𝜆𝜆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎� 𝛼𝛼 + 1 . We computed the 
eigenvalues of 𝔾𝔾 by tridiagonal reduction using Householder algorithm and subsequently by the 
diagonalization of the reduced matrix using QL algorithm (Press et al., 1992). 
 
5.4. Calibration 
Because their real population distributions of the model parameters were unknown, we performed 
Monte Carlo simulations centered on real market data, considering them as the true population 
(Efron & Tibshirani, 1993; Mooney & Duval, 1993). To do this, we selected the parameters so that the 
squared-errors ( 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)2  were minimized over the entire sample observations. Introducing a 
partition of the full time window by discrete time points (𝑡𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑡𝐾𝐾), we then added the errors at each 
time point, weighted the quantity by the measurement error 𝜎𝜎𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  of each 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 , and generated an 






𝑖𝑖=1 , where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of variables, and 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is 
the number of sample data points. Finally, we estimated the parameters by minimizing 𝜒𝜒2 by the 
Levenberg-Marquardt method (Press et al., 1992). The steps are as follows: 
1. Using actual market data, construct the graph Laplacian 𝔾𝔾0. 
2. From 𝔾𝔾0, estimate the parameters for one stable state of the dynamics. Let 𝛩𝛩0 be the parameter 
set 𝛩𝛩0 = (𝛼𝛼0,𝛽𝛽0, 𝛾𝛾0}. 
3. Resample the tie weights of the interlock network uniformly at random with replacement. 
4. Choose the same number of sampled tie weights at a time and assign them to an initially 
unweighted configuration of the network. 
5. Compute a bootstrapped 𝔾𝔾 = 𝔾𝔾1 for this network. 
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7. Repeat steps 2–5 as many times as desired to generate the parameter sampling distribution 
{𝛩𝛩�2, … ,𝛩𝛩�𝐵𝐵}. 
After the successful termination of this procedure, we computed the relevant parameter confidence 
intervals by the percentile method (Joshi et al., 2006): If 𝛩𝛩� (𝛼𝛼) represents the 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼) percentile, then 





6. Results and Discussions15 
6.1. Macro Features 
The two networks employed in this study are the board interlocks of LFCs and SNAs, restricted to 
separate sectors of the industry, where a sector is specified by the sector in which the primary (focal) 
firm operates. Table 2 displays the values of the macrostructure metrics of these networks. As already 
mentioned before, results from four of the largest sectors according to the sizes of their interlocks are 
discussed in this paper. These sectors are fashion, manufacturing, transport, and food. 




, indicate the sparseness of these networks (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The mean degrees lie 
in the range of 1.9 – 3.8, and the mean strengths per vertex in the range 2.5 – 5.2. The values for SNAs 
are slightly higher than those for LFCs. Overall, they signify that connection centralities of the 
interlocked firms are somewhat low, a result that is further corroborated by the small value of the 
degree centralization of the networks. The centralization measures the extent to which interlocking 








, where 𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 is the largest degree, 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 is the degree of firm 𝑖𝑖, and max [… ] gives the 
theoretical maximum sum of differences in the degrees in the network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
The low value is indicative of an interlock density that does not depend significantly on the highly 
connected firms. The large-scale topology of the networks shows that this characteristic is similar 
across LFC and SNA interlocks. 
The betweenness centrality 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 of firm 𝑖𝑖 is an indicator of the extent to which the firm lies on paths 








,  , where 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the 
number of geodesics (shortest paths) connecting firms 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑘𝑘 that pass through firm 𝑖𝑖, and 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 
total number of geodesics between 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑘𝑘 (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). For both LFCs and SNAs, the 
average betweenness scores are much higher in manufacturing, transport, and food than those in 
the fashion. This makes perfect sense, because the majority of the fashion firms do not span multiple 
other firms either within or across sectors. By contrast, the specific nature of business transactions in 
transport, manufacturing, and food makes most firms in these sectors overlap with multiple other 
firms. Moreover, in all cases, the average betweenness of LFCs is somewhat lower than that of SNAs. 
Next, we measured the geodesic distance between two firms in terms of the number of interlocks 
between them, and on averaging over all firms, the mean distance is computed (Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). In a small-world network, this distance scales as ln (𝑛𝑛)  (Newman 2003). One may 
compare this with the corresponding metric of a random network consisting of 𝑛𝑛 firms and with a 
mean degree of 𝜗𝜗, where the distance scales as 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑  ~ 
ln (𝑛𝑛)
ln (𝜗𝜗)
 (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). A comparison 
 
15 For considerations of space, we present complete results for the manufacturing sector only, which serves the purpose of 
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between the mean distances of the networks under consideration and those of their random 
counterparts is a test for their small-worldliness (Watts, 1999; Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Additionally, the 
diameters of LFCs came out to be slightly larger than those of SNAs. 
Table 2: Large-scale interlock network metrics for LFC and SNA firms in four sectors: 






  Fashion Manufacturing Transport Food 
LFC SNA LFC SNA LFC SNA LFC SNA 
𝑛𝑛 101 151 117 140 99 128 93 122 Network size (number of vertices)  
𝑚𝑚 116 185 149 177 118 242 128 154 Number of edges in network 
𝜌𝜌 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 Network density 
𝜗𝜗 2.01 2.45 1.93 2.53 2.33 3.78 2.11 2.52 Mean network degree 
𝜍𝜍 2.91 3.67 2.71 3.60 3.06 5.17 2.46 3.95 Mean network strength 
𝜎𝜎𝜗𝜗 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.05 Degree centralization 
𝛽𝛽 2.7 3.2 10.1 15.7 16.3 23.9 11.4 12.7 Mean betweenness centrality (scaled) 


















Mean geodesic distance (random 
network) 
𝛿𝛿 16 13 14 13 12 11 15 13 Network diameter 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 0.53 0.51 0.39 0.35 0.38 0.31 0.50 0.41 Global clustering coefficient 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 Global clustering coefficient (random 
network) 
 
Finally, the fraction of transitive triads in a network is a measure of its clustering coefficient (CC). This 
is the probability that any two randomly selected adjacent firms of a focal firm are themselves first 
neighbors. We computed the CC using the Watts-Strogatz formula (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Again, a 




 (Newman, 2003). As evident from Table 2, for both LFCs and SNAs, the CC’s far 
exceed the values for their random networks. This lends additional support for the small-worldliness of 
both classes of networks (Watts, 1999), although the effect is slightly more prominent in SNAs. 
5.2. Investment Structures 
5.2.1. Simulations of models 1 and 2 
As discussed earlier, the balance condition in model 1 is achieved at 𝐼𝐼∗ = 1 (in appropriate units). The 
basin boundaries separating the regions of stability and instability of the underlying dynamics 
represented in parameter space are displayed in Figure 3 for all interlocks. The relative significances 
of the parameters 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are characterized by the values of the slopes of the straight lines that 
demarcate the two regions, which are shown in parentheses in the legend. The entire region lying 
below the basin boundary is stable, and the one above it is unstable. Any point lying exactly on the 
line is metastable. SNA basin boundaries lie above LFC boundaries. Thus, for SNAs, more flexibility is 
available in the choice of the 𝛼𝛼’s and the 𝛽𝛽’s. To increase visual clarity, different scales for the vertical 
and horizontal axes in the figure give the appearance of a much-magnified stability region. In 
numerical terms, the regions are actually quite small. This signifies that, small perturbations in the 
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system to slide to the unstable region. In model 2, stability again emerges at 𝐼𝐼∗ = 1. The results are 
displayed in Figure 4. The stability regions are comparatively smaller in this model, which renders the 
relative distributions of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛾𝛾 even more delicate than in the previous model. 
Figure 3. Basin boundaries of interlock  Figure 4. Basin boundaries of interlock  
networks in model 1     networks in model 2 
  
5.2.2. Parameter significance 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the relative significance of the two modes of investments is 
limited by the size of the stability regions in parameter space. As for the first model, the investment 
dynamics becomes unstable when 𝛽𝛽  becomes sufficiently large to make 4(𝛼𝛼
𝛽𝛽
)  smaller than the 
Laplacian’s largest eigenvalue. This corresponds in practice to a situation in which interlinked 
investments significantly dominate firm-specific ones. It has the effect of making investments in high-
mean-strength, low-density networks unstable. The typical mean strength of the present networks is 
not overly high (Table 4). If the investment dynamics is to operate in the desired configuration, the 
interlinked component must be appropriately strategized. The situation is encouraging in a stable-
balance configuration, because a strong, interlinked component greatly facilitates individual firms 
to strategize their capital expenditures quite selectively. Starting from an unbalanced configuration 
at some time, this has the potential to eventually raise firm-specific investments to a new level, where 
a stable balance obtains in the underlying investment dynamics. 
5.2.3. Monte Carlo simulations 
Figure 5. Manufacturing sector bootstraps  
of 𝜶𝜶 and 𝜷𝜷 in model 1 for the SNA interlock 
Figure 6. Manufacturing sector bootstraps  
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In the results of the two-parameter Monte Carlo simulations of models 1 and 2, displayed in Figures 5 
and 6 for the manufacturing sector of SNA interlock, there is a clear indication of a correlation 
between the model parameters. For example, in Figure 5, the 𝛼𝛼-𝛽𝛽 correlation in model 1 is about 0.84 
(significant at 95%). For transport, fashion, and food, these correlations are, respectively, 0.77, 0.79, 
and 0.88, all significant at 95%. Three confidence intervals (CI) are shown in the figure, at the same 
level of significance. A band enclosed by two vertical lines characterize the 95% CI for 𝛼𝛼 
independent of 𝛽𝛽, and by two horizontal lines characterize a 95% CI for 𝛽𝛽 independent of 𝛼𝛼. The joint 
distribution of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 is represented by an ellipse for a 95% CI (Press et al., 1992). Similar plots are 
shown for model 2 in Figure 6, where the 𝛼𝛼-𝛾𝛾 correlation is close to 0.91 (significant at 95%). Using the 
average value 𝛩𝛩� of a parameter, the range 𝛬𝛬 and the shape 𝛤𝛤 of its CI can be computed by using 
the formulas 𝛬𝛬 = 𝛩𝛩�𝑢𝑢 − 𝛩𝛩�𝑙𝑙 and 𝛤𝛤 =
𝜃𝜃�𝑢𝑢−𝜃𝜃�
𝜃𝜃�−𝜃𝜃�𝑙𝑙
 (Joshi et al., 2006). In this case, 𝛤𝛤 > 1.0 gives a shorter distance 
from 𝛩𝛩�  to 𝛩𝛩𝑙𝑙  than from 𝛩𝛩�𝑢𝑢 to 𝛩𝛩� . By contrast, for a normal distribution, 𝛤𝛤 = 1.0, the distribution being 
symmetric about 𝛩𝛩�. In model 1, nearly 95% of the cases had 𝛤𝛤 ≈ 1.43, and for model 2, 95% of the 
cases had 𝛤𝛤 ≈ 0.94. Linearity is therefore ensured for manufacturing, although there is an indication 
of some slight deviation from linearity in model 1. For transport, fashion, and food, we obtained, 
respectively, 𝛤𝛤 ≈ 0.92 (model 1), 𝛤𝛤 ≈ 0.94 (model 2); 𝛤𝛤 ≈ 1.17 (model 1), 𝛤𝛤 ≈ 0.91 (model 2); 𝛤𝛤 ≈ 1.28 
(model 1), 𝛤𝛤 ≈ 1.09 (model 2). These are, therefore, quite similar to those for manufacturing. 
5.2.4. Model Use 
With the models calibrated as described above, we next proceed to perform a comparative analysis 
of the market and the model behavior of aggregate investments of the firms in SNA and LFC 
interlocks. For considerations of space, we only consider the case of manufacturing in model 1. First, 
we perform a computation of the deviation amounts, in real time, of the average market values of 
firm investments from the stable values predicted by the models. Using the formalism described 








. The predicted values of the investments are then obtained from the 
relation 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), and the amount of deviation for firm 𝑖𝑖 is calculated as ∆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡), 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡) is the actual, market value of the investment amount of firm 𝑖𝑖 at period 𝑡𝑡. The procedure 
can be summarized as follows: 
1. Numerically integrate the above equation over a predefined partition consisting of 𝑛𝑛 time 
points (𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛) to obtain the predicted values. 
2. Calculate deviations by taking the difference of predicted amounts and the actual market 
values at the corresponding time points. 
3. Select a pair of parameter values, say ?⃗?𝜃𝑖𝑖 = (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖), from the stable region in parameter 
space. 
4. Using these values in the numerical integration, compute the deviation amount ∆𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) =
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) at time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖. 
5. At each selected time point, compute the average deviation over a sufficiently large 
number, say 𝑀𝑀, of sample points selected uniformly at random from the stable region in 






Figures 7 exhibits the results of these computations. The horizontal axis represents the time (in years) 
for the period 2007–2015. The vertical axis shows the relative absolute deviations (RAD) computed as 
a percent difference between the stable values predicted by the model and the median market 
values of investments of firms for each year. Over practically the entire window, the deviations are 
found to be larger for LFCs, close to 46%, than for SNAs, close to 20%. Deviations of approximately 
the same order were also found for transport, fashion, and food: Transport (LFC: 41%; SNA: 21%); 
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However, it is important to remember that the stable values more accurately reflect the investment 
dynamics incorporated into the model unfolding on the interlocks, which is adapted to longer 
horizons than the present nine-year period shown here. Besides, since the market often reacts 
unpredictably to exogenous influences, large deviations between the actual market values and the 
predicted values are not entirely unexpected and do appear from time to time. 
Figure 7. RAD values in model 1 
(manufacturing) 





The second set of computations is based on a different approach. Here, interest focuses on the study 
of parameter deviations in real time from their stable values in parameter space. The procedure runs 
as follows: 
1. For a specific choice of parameters, say ?⃗?𝜃 = (𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽), not necessarily selected from the stable 
region in parameter space, compute the predicted value 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃
�⃗(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖)  at time 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  using the 
model. 
2. Imagine that it is the actual market value at that time. In other words, for firm 𝑖𝑖, set 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃
�⃗(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) =
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃
�⃗(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖), so that 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃
�⃗(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) − 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, a known quantity. 
3. Taking an initial deviation, say 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖(0) = 𝜂𝜂0 , numerically integrate the model differential 
equation and obtain 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃
�⃗(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖) = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖�?⃗?𝜃, Ϝ� = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖�?⃗?𝜃, Ϝ� is a function of the parameter vector 
?⃗?𝜃 and other known quantities, represented symbolically by Ϝ. 
4. To study the behavior of only one parameter at a time, randomly select a value of 𝛼𝛼 from the 
stable region in the parameter space, say 𝛼𝛼 = 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 , and use it in the above equation to 
compute the corresponding value of 𝛽𝛽. 
5. Compare this 𝛽𝛽 value with the average of all permissible values of 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 corresponding to the 
fixed but randomly selected 𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 from the stable region in parameter space. 




7. The foregoing procedure is now executed repeatedly at each time point 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 , 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛. 
 
The results for both SNAs and LFCs are displayed in Figure 8. The 𝛽𝛽-errors lie in the range of 11 − 17%. 
These are not large, signifying that there is much greater flexibility in the selection of a wide range of 
𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 from 𝛼𝛼’s stable region in parameter space. Of course, for some periods, the 𝛽𝛽-errors may actually 
turn out to be large. Should this be the case, it would be necessary to turn the argument around and 
look for reasonably small 𝛼𝛼 -deviations by selecting appropriate 𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎  from 𝛽𝛽 ’s stable region in 
parameter space. It is also evident that, overall, the 𝛽𝛽-errors for SNAs are smaller than those of LFCs. 
SNAs seem to have much greater flexibility in the choice of their supply-chain network of partners 
through the strategic appointment of independent directors on their boards. By contrast, LFCs may 





THE DAVIDS AND THE GOLIATHS 
of a large fraction of extended family members of their promoters. Some of these independent, 
nonexecutive directors are from firms in unrelated sectors of the market and do not have first-hand 
experience in the market domain in which the focal firm operates. They play only decorative roles 
on the board or pay lip service to the decisions taken by the promoters. This results in reduced 
investment efficiency and low market performance (Bajpai, 2016; Gollakota & Gupta, 2006; Kumar 
& Singh, 2013). The 𝛽𝛽-errors for transport, fashion, and food lie, respectively, in the ranges of 9 − 21%, 
13 − 26%, and 11 − 23%. Again, these errors are not overly large and comparable in magnitude with 
those for manufacturing. 
5.2.5. Firm Performance 
With the capital investment dynamics unfolding on the firm interlocks, we first computed the stable 
investment values of the firms according to the underlying dynamics. Next, we segregated all firms 
in SNA and LFC interlocks into two groups. Group 1 (G1): Firms that attained stability according to the 
underlying dynamics; Group 2 (G2): Firms that did not attain stability. We then compared the firms in 
these two groups on their ROE performance and computed the firm performance differential using 
a quantity defined as 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥 = 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎−𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎���
𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎+𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎���
, where 𝛥𝛥𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 stands for the yearly average value of ROE for a firm that 
has reached stability, and 𝛥𝛥𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎�  is the value for a firm that has not reached stability. 
Figure 9. Performance (ROE) differentials 
(manufacturing) 





Figures 9 and 10 display the results of the performance comparison study for the manufacturing 
sector interlocks over a window of 2008-2015 inclusive. As Figure 9 shows, for both SNA and LFC 
interlocks, G1 had consistently higher performance scores than G2 in all the years included in the 
window. Besides, over the years, the performance differentials for SNAs are somewhat higher (about 
12% on the average) than those for LFCs. Figure 10 displays the average ROE performance scores of 
the G1 firms for both SNA and LFC interlocks. The average performance of the G1 group of firms of 
SNA interlock is consistently higher than that of the G1 group of firms of LFC interlock, except in two 
years where LFC performance score is only 3% higher. We also obtained similar results for transport, 
fashion, and food. The G2 firms are not included in the performance comparison study, because their 
performance scores are much lower, in any case, than those of the G1 firms for both interlocks. In 
Figure 10, the right-hand (secondary) vertical axis shows the fraction of firms within the group that 
attained stability according to the underlying investment dynamics. Fractions of SNAs are clearly 
much larger than fractions of LFCs in all periods. It is curious that several LFCs in the G2 group exhibited 
performance closely comparable to the performance of the firms in the G1 group. Such is not the 







THE DAVIDS AND THE GOLIATHS 
5.2.6. Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analysis 
In order to gain a deeper insight into the current findings, we repeated all of the previous analyses 
using supplementary model 2 and additionally performed robustness checks for the results. To this 
end, we compared SNAs and LFCs in the two groups G1 and G2 on three additional measures of 
performance: ROA; TQ; and PE. As before, we computed, in each of the remaining three sectors 
(fashion, transport, and food) the firm performance differentials 𝛥𝛥𝛥𝛥  where 𝛥𝛥 = {𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃} . The 
results obtained from these analyses are quite similar to the above results for the ROE measure in the 
manufacturing sector. However, in each of the years within the selected time window, the firm 
fractions turned out to be somewhat large for manufacturing and fashion compared with the values 
obtained for transport and food. For considerations of space, these results are not included here. 
 
6. Limitations and Conclusion 
SNAs engaging in supply-chain networked transactions make investments in capital expenditures 
both individually and in cooperative association with their partner firms. Investments to meet internal 
demands of a firm are specific to the firm. By contrast, when functioning in interlinked modes, firms 
strategically align their investments in order to accommodate interfirm specificities typical in 
associative operations, with each firm in the interlinking chain having its portfolio of investment items. 
From the current perspective, firm investments are most effective when a harmonizing balance exists 
between the firm-specific and the firm-interlinked forms of investment. In Indian firms, board interlocks 
are essential channels through which firms operate within supply-chain linkages, wherein a group of 
firms can adjust their investments for streamlining production or service operations as well as for 
minimizing fluctuations in their supply chains. Ultimately, it helps the firms to deal more effectively with 
uncertain demands or erratic supply problems. In some situations, financial managers are prone to 
plan investments under pre-set constraints. Moreover, many expenditure items are not fixed initially, 
and different firms tend to spend widely unequal proportions of expenditure on these items. It then 
becomes difficult to sustain such investments over long periods, because instabilities invariably 
develop in their financial systems. This is the primary justification for the use of the simulations in this 
study. 
The present framework is predicated upon a resource-dependence view that SNAs strategically 
choose directors on their boards from their potential partner firms in order to have access to the 
critical resources of these firms. In point of fact, this is largely true for our sample of firms. Nevertheless, 
institution scholars have pointed out that the environments of firms are not always dependable, in 
that interfirm ties give rise to new dependencies and shift the balance in the firm relationship 
structures, such as when partner firms compete with one another for control over critical resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hallen et al., 2014). If the firms in question are actually competing in some 
sectors, opportunistic firm behavior may result. Thus, while competing firms collaborate for shared 
benefits, they can simultaneously behave opportunistically to produce a power imbalance and 
force a partner into an unfavourable position (Agarwal et al., 2010; Gulati & Singh, 1998)16. This 
behavior can be incorporated into our study by employing a suitable economic utility function. 
It is true that interlocking directorates are an effective way to strengthen strategic ties and to 
effectively exploit network advantages. Nevertheless, positive strategic advantages in investment 
decisions and increased competitiveness can also result from cooperation with strategic partners, 
even without shared directors on the board. Thus, in many cases, partnerships and strategic ties 
 
16 For example, “swimming with a shark” is a situation in which a young, rising firm forges a tie with an established large firm 
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signify an increase in knowledge, resources and thus also in market opportunities, even without 
interlocking directorates. These additional benefits can be leveraged to bolster the tie strengths used 
in the present formalism. On a different note, many of the adversities and challenges confronted by 
SNAs are the same as or are very similar to the difficulties faced by LFCs in India. These, for instance, 
may arise from market conditions, government decisions and policies, global economic conditions, 
as well as man-made or natural calamities, such as the recent Covid-19 pandemic that played 
havoc with the national economy. LFCs, because of their large size and financial strength, have 
much better advantages to deal with these issues than SNAs. Nevertheless, it may also be the case 
that SNAs, due to their small size and less bureaucratic structure, have advantages in some areas 
compared to LFCs. These issues are likely to have an influence on the performance indicators 
considered in the present study. 
We mentioned earlier that over short initial periods, investment coordination between firms might be 
incomplete and somewhat unsteady. This is perfectly normal. However, because we were primarily 
concerned with long-run, steady-state investment behavior, our model applied best to long time 
frames when initial interfirm instabilities in coordinated investments have become negligible. Another 
issue concerns the absence of cross-level interactions between the two types of investment functions 
considered here. In actual practice, firm-specific investments depend somewhat on the interlinked 
ones. Therefore, to make the framework more general and robust, interaction effects should be 
included at the next higher level. This procedure, albeit computationally intensive, is conceptually 
clear. As far as we can see on the strength of empirical evidence at this time, we do not have a 
convincing causal effect of interactions between firm investments on their performance. Additional 
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